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PREHEARING DISCOVERY UNDER
WISCONSIN'S WORKER'S
COMPENSATION ACT: A
REVIEW AND CRITIQUE
LAWRENCE ALAN TOWERS*
The value of a successful permanent total disability action
averaged $265,548 in 1983.1 Yet, under the Wisconsin
Worker's Compensation Act,2 almost no party-initiated pre-
hearing discovery is permitted. As a consequence, counsel for
the employee and employer enter hearings with almost no in-
formation respecting the other's position. Unfocused hearings
and unjust decisions are too frequently the result.
This article will examine the existing discovery rules and
policy underpinnings of Wisconsin's Worker's Compensation
Act; it will explore the problems attendant to these discovery
rules and examine some recurring examples of each; and fi-
nally, this article will suggest ways of modifying the existing
discovery rules to permit more party-initiated discovery
thereby remedying these problems while maintaining conso-
nance with the Act's policy underpinnings.
I. WISCONSIN'S WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT
A. Introduction.
In enacting the Worker's Compensation Act, Wisconsin's
legislators sought to expedite the process from initial applica-
* Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School; A.B., 1974, Kenyon Col-
lege; M.P.A., 1979, California State University-Hayward; J.D., 1981, Hastings College
of the Law. Prior to his appointment as an Assistant Professor, Mr. Towers represented
both applicants and employers in worker's compensation actions at Whyte &
Hirschboeck, S.C. of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
1. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations, "Preliminary Data: Sum-
mary of Cases Initially Closed in 1983."
2. Wis. STAT. § 102.01(1) (1983-84) entitles Chapter 102 the "Worker's Compen-
sation Act."
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tion through hearing and award.' Since "fault" is not at issue
under the Worker's Compensation Act,' and thus, facts going
to the issue of negligence need not be discovered and liti-
gated,5 it was thought that simplification of the procedures
parties use to prepare for hearing would expedite worker's
compensation actions. 6 In this manner, the drafters of Wis-
consin's Worker's Compensation Act sought to provide com-
pensation to injured workers and their dependents 7 by a
method as simple and summary as was consistent with the
protection of the interests of all parties.
Of course, while expediency is a worthy objective, the Act
must also comply with the due process requirements of a full
hearing and fair play. 9 In Theodore Fleisner, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Industry, Labor and Human Relations,10 the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court held that a worker's compensation
hearing, in order to comply with the requisites of due process,
must afford procedural protections of (1) the right of each
party to seasonably know the charges or claims proffered; (2)
the right of each party to meet such charges or claims by com-
petent evidence; and (3) the right to be heard by counsel upon
3. See Schneider Fuel & Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 224 Wis. 298, 272 N.W. 25 (1937).
In Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 337, 133 N.W. 209, 211 (1911), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court commented on the purpose of the newly-created "Workmen's Compen-
sation Act":
It has endeavored by this law to provide a way by which employer and employed
may, if they so choose, escape entirely from the very troublesome and economi-
cally absurd luxury known as personal injury litigation, and resort to a system by
which every employee not guilty of wilful misconduct may receive at once a
reasonable recompense for injuries accidentally received in his employment
under certain fixed rules, without a lawsuit and without friction.
4. See Guse v. A.O. Smith Corp., 260 Wis. 403, 406, 51 N.W.2d 24, 26 (1952).
5. See Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 95 Wis. 2d 173, 183, 290 N.W.2d 276, 281
(1980).
6. See Borgnis v. Falk, 147 Wis. at 337, 133 N.W. at 211.
7. Speelmon Elevated Tank Serv. v. Indus. Comm'n, 2 Wis. 2d 181, 185, 85
N.W.2d 834, 836 (1957).
8. Bellrichard v. Indus. Comm'n, 248 Wis. 231, 239, 21 N.W.2d 395, 398 (1946).
See also, Woodside School Dist. No. 8 v. Indus. Comm'n, 241 Wis. 469, 6 N.W.2d 182
(1942).
9. It is not contended that failure to provide prehearing discovery procedures vio-
lates due process. This does not appear to be open to dispute. See Starr v. Comm'r, 226
F.2d 721, 722 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 993 (1959). But see infra notes 77-
82 and accompanying text.
10. 65 Wis. 2d 317, 222 N.W.2d 600 (1974). See also State ex rel. Richey v. Nee-
nah Police & Fire Comm'n, 48 Wis. 2d 575, 580, 180 N.W.2d 743, 746 (1970).
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the probative force of the evidence and upon the law applica-
ble thereto."I
Thus, Wisconsin's Worker's Compensation Act, like all
worker's compensation laws, seeks to "strik[e] a balance be-
tween relaxation of rules to prevent injustice and retention of
rules to ensure orderly decision making and protection of fun-
damental rights."' 12 Prehearing discovery provisions under
the Act evidence the dynamic nature of this quest for such a
balance.
B. Prehearing Discovery Rules Under Wisconsin's Worker's
Compensation Act.
The Worker's Compensation Act provides the Depart-
ment of Industry, Labor and Human Relations ("DILHR")
with the authority to conduct prehearing discovery through
vehicles that are as varied and broad in scope as those
designed for civil actions under the Wisconsin and Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 13
As in a civil action, a pleading is filed and served to com-
mence a worker's compensation action. This pleading, called
an Application for Hearing and made on a form prescribed by
DILHR, 14 supplies information respecting "the general nature
of any claim as to which any dispute or controversy may have
arisen .. ."5 However, since the applicant, at this point,
has already provided the employer with the statutory notice of
injury, 16 including at minimum information pertaining to the
nature, timing and location of the injury, 17 the information
11. Fleisner, 65 Wis. 2d 317, 326, 222 N.W.2d 600, 606 (1974).
12. 3 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 77A.83 (1952).
13. Compare WIs. STAT. § 804 (1983-84) and FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
14. Applicants are to use DILHR form WC-7.
15. Wis. STAT. § 102.17(1)(a) (1983-84).
16. Wis. STAT. § 102.12 (1983-84) requires an employee who sustains a work-re-
lated injury to give notice to his employer.
17. Prior to filing the application, the employee is required to give the employer
"Notice of Injury", which must include the fact of the injury, the nature of the disabil-
ity, and the relationship of the disability to the employment. See WIs. STAT. § 102.12
(1983-84); Glancy Malleable Iron Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 216 Wis. 615, 620, 258 N.W.
445, 448 (1935).
According to W. Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 24 Wis. 2d 439, 442-43,
129 N.W.2d 127, 130 (1964), "actual notice of injury" need be no more than a declara-
tion made to the employer that an injury occurred under circumstances that would
apprise the employer that it arose out of and was incidental to his employment.
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provided in the Application appears more for the benefit of
DILHR than for the employer.1 8
The employer, in turn, files an Answer to Application, on
a form provided by DILHR;19 the Answer places in issue
those allegations which the employer disputes.2" Inasmuch as
the employer, prior to this step in the procedure, has denied
voluntarily approving payment for the alleged injury,21 the
key aspects of its position, as set forth in its Answer to Appli-
cation, should be of no surprise to the applicant. Again, the
Answer to Application appears more for the benefit of
DILHR than for the applicant.
Section 102.17 of the Wisconsin Statutes is the repository
of most of the Act's prehearing discovery rules and proce-
dures. Section 102.17(1)(e) provides:
The department may, with or without notice to either party,
cause testimony to be taken, or an inspection of the premises
where the injury occurred to be made, or the time books and
payrolls of the employer to be examined by any examiner,
and may direct any employe claiming compensation to be
examined by a physician, chiropractor or podiatrist. The
testimony so taken, and the results of any such inspection or
examination, shall be reported to the department for its con-
sideration upon final hearing. All ex parte testimony taken
by the department shall be reduced to writing and either
party shall have the opportunity to rebut such testimony on
final hearing.
Thus, throughout the pendency of the action, DILHR is
granted the power to conduct almost all modes of civil discov-
ery,22 including depositions of parties or witnesses, the pro-
18. See Balczewski v. DILHR, 76 Wis. 2d 487, 490, 251 N.W.2d 794, 796 (1977)
(employer "apparently failed to recognize the legal theory upon which the claimant
proceeded" because "the claimant did not identify the theory of her claim with particu-
larity"). See also Bituminous Casualty Co. v. DILHR, 97 Wis. 2d 730, 734-35, 295
N.W.2d 183, 187 (Ct. App. 1980) (employer even had the benefit of a prehearing brief
filed by the applicant).
19. Employers are to use DILHR form WC-19.
20. Wis. ADMIN. CODE § IND 80.05(2) (1982).
21. An employer is always free to stipulate to liability and file a written stipulation
with DILHR. Wis. STAT. § 102.16(1) (1983-84). See also, Levitan, Practice Before the
Industrial Commission, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 252.
22. Indeed, DILHR has one valuable power that reaches much farther than the
powers granted private civil litigants. Wis. STAT. § 102.17(1)(g) (1983-84) provides:
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duction of documents and things and entry upon land,23 and
the medical examination of the applicant by a medical expert
of DILHR's choice.24 Significantly, DILHR has the authority
to conduct such discovery ex parte.25
Whenever the testimony presented at any hearing indicates a dispute, or is such
as to create doubt as to the extent or cause of disability or death, the department
may direct that the injured employe be examined or an autopsy be performed, or
an opinion of a physician, chiropractor or podiatrist be obtained without exami-
nation or autopsy, by an impartial, competent physician, chiropractor or podia-
trist designated by the department who is not under contract with or regularly
employed by a compensation insurance carrier or self-insured employer. The
expense of such examination shall be paid by the employer. The report of such
examination shall be transmitted in writing to the department and a copy thereof
shall be furnished by the department to each party, who shall have an opportu-
nity to rebut such report on further hearing.
Thus, DILHR also has the power to conduct discovery after the conclusion of the hear-
ing. This power also extends to ordering post-hearing autopsies where the cause of
death is in dispute. See WIs. STAT. § 102.17(1)(c) (1983-84).
23. Wis. STAT. § 102.17(l)(h) (1983-84) permits DILHR to employ and utilize in-
dustrial safety specialists to investigate alleged safety violations on an employer's
premises:
The contents of certified reports of investigation, made by industrial safety
specialists who are employed by the department and available for cross-examina-
tion, served upon the parties 15 days prior to hearing, shall constitute prima
facie evidence as to matter contained therein.
24. Wis. STAT. § 102.13(3) (1983-84) grants DILHR the authority to hire a medi-
cal expert to examine the applicant in order to decide an existing disparity between
opinions of the applicant's and employer's medical experts:
If 2 or more physicians, chiropractors or podiatrists disagree as to the extent
of an injured employe's temporary disability, the end of an employee's healing
period or an employe's ability to return to work at suitable available employ-
ment, the department may appoint another physician, chiropractor or podiatrist
to examine the employe and render an opinion as soon as possible. The depart-
ment shall promptly notify the parties of this appointment. The employer or its
insurance carrier or both shall pay for the examination and opinion.
25. Professor Larson underscores the due process dangers of such an ex parte
procedure:
The basic right to confront, cross-examine and refute must be respected. ...
Under the increasingly common practice of referral of claimant to an official
medical examiner or an independent physician chosen by the commission, it is
particularly important that commissions not lose sight of the elementary require-
ment that the parties be given an opportunity to see such a doctor's report, cross-
examine him, and if necessary provide rebuttal testimony.
LARSON, supra note 12, at § 79.63.
Of course, Wisconsin procedure would permit such cross-examination of a subpoe-
naed witness at hearing. However, such action would unnecessarily multiply the pro-
1985]
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DILHR is also granted power to conduct a prehearing
conference, much like a pretrial conference in civil litigation,26
where "the clarification of issues, the joining of additional par-
ties, the necessity or desirability of amendments to pleadings,
the obtaining of admissions of fact or of documents, records,
reports, and bills which may avoid unnecessary proof and
such other matters as may aid in disposition of the dispute or
controversy" may be considered. Upon conclusion of the
prehearing conference, the hearing examiner is empowered to
order "disclosure or exchange of any information or written
material which it considers material to the timely and orderly
disposition of the dispute or controversy.
' 28
While DILHR is granted authority to conduct prehearing
discovery almost as broad as that granted parties in civil liti-
gation, 9 the parties themselves can do little more than request
that DILHR conduct such discovery.30
Three exceptions exist to this rule that parties cannot con-
duct discovery independent of DILHR. First, Section
102.13(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes requires an applicant to
submit to a medical examination by a medical expert of the
employer's choice. 31 Second, Section 102.13(2) creates a stat-
utory waiver of the applicant's physician-patient privilege of
confidentiality with respect to his medical history upon the
ceedings - which is antithetical to the Act's expediency purpose. Moreover, the parties
would have no time to develop rebuttal testimony.
This ex parte procedure, and the concern that due process be complied with, has
existed for a long time. See Int'l Harvester v. Indus. Comm'n, 157 Wis. 167, 147 N.W.
53 (1914).
26. Cf WIs. STAT. § 802.11 (1983-84).
27. Wis. STAT. § 102.17(l)(b) (1983-84).
28. Id.
29. Compare Wis. STAT. § 102.17(l)(b) (1983-84) with Wis. STAT. § 804 and FED.
R. Civ. P. 26-36.
30. See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
31. Wis. STAT. § 102.13(1) (1983-84) provides, in relevant part:
Except as provided in sub. (4), whenever compensation is claimed by an em-
ploye, the employe shall, upon the written request of the employee's employer,
submit to reasonable examination by a physician, chiropractor or podiatrist, pro-
vided and paid for by the employer, and shall submit to examination by any
physician, chiropractor or podiatrist selected by the commission or an
examiner. . ..
The remainder of § 102.13(1) provides for the conditions upon which an employer
can conduct such a medical examination and the sanctions available where the appli-
cant resists or obstructs such medical examination.
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filing of an Application,32 and thereby permits the employer,
among others, to discover the applicant's medical file.33
Third, under very limited conditions, a party is allowed to
conduct prehearing depositions of witnesses (party or non-
party).34  Essentially, depositions of witnesses can be con-
ducted and utilized only when it is apparent that the witness
will not otherwise be available for the hearing. However,
these prehearing depositions are not discovery depositions but
serve instead to preserve testimony for the hearing. There-
fore, the scope of prehearing depositions is more narrow than
the scope of discovery depositions, as it is limited to admissi-
ble evidence.35
C. Policy Underpinnings of These Discovery Rules.
The aforedescribed discovery tools are many and varied.
Indeed, they generally parallel in quantity and kind those
available to civil litigants under the Wisconsin and Federal
32. See also Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau, 1981 Senate Bill 625.
33. Wis. STAT. § 102.13(2) (1983-84) READS:
An employe who reports an injury alleged to be work-related or files an ap-
plication for hearing waives any physician-patient privilege. Notwithstanding
sec. 51.30 and sec. 146.82 and any other law, any physician, chiropractor, podia-
trist, hospital or health care provider shall, within a reasonable time after written
request by the employe, employer, worker's compensation insurer or department
or its representative, provide that person with any information or written mate-
rial reasonably related to any injury for which the employe claims compensation.
Wis. ADMIN. CODE § IND 80.21 (1982) permits DILHR to distribute the applicant's
medical reports to the employer:
"Upon the request of the department, any party in interest to a claim under ch. 102,
Stats., shall furnish to the department and to all parties in interest copies of all reports
by practitioners and expert witnesses in their possession or procurable by them."
34. Wis. STAT § 102.17(1)(f) (1983-84) provides:
Sections 804.05 and 804.07 shall not apply to proceedings under this chapter,
except as to a witness:
1. Who is beyond reach of the subpoena of the department; or
2. Who is about to go out of the state, not intending to return in time for the
hearing; or
3. Who is so sick, infirmed or aged as to make it probable that the witness
will not be able to attend the hearing; or
4. Who is a member of the legislature, if any committee of the same or the
house of which the witness is a member, is in session, provided the witness
waives his or her privilege.
35. Wis. ADMIN. CODE § IND 80.11 (1982) makes this explicit: "Depositions may
be taken and used in any hearing only in accordance with § 102.17(l)(O, Stats. These
depositions shall be taken in the same manner as in courts of record. Depositions for the
purpose of discovery are specifically prohibited." Id. (emphasis added).
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Civil Rules of Procedure.36 However, these discovery tools
are rarely used. This fact is undoubtedly due in part to the
fact that except in limited circumstances, prehearing discov-
ery is conducted by DILHR rather than the parties.
In civil litigation, discovery may be initiated by a party
without judicial intervention.37 Judicial intervention occurs
only when disputes arise concerning the proper scope of dis-
covery under the existing circumstances. 38 Thus, in civil liti-
gation, the court acts as a policeman.
In Wisconsin worker's compensation litigation, however,
discovery is channelled through, controlled by, and generally
even implemented by DILHR.39 Moreover, in most cases the
initial decision as to whether or not discovery will occur must
be made by DILHR rather than by the parties.4' Indeed,
DILHR is given great latitude in determining if, when and
how much discovery takes place in any particular action.41
The only limiting considerations are those demanded by due
process.42 Thus, under the Act, DILHR acts as a gatekeeper
rather than as a policeman.
This worker's compensation procedure, it is thought, pre-
vents conflict thereby avoiding the protraction of proceedings
that discovery disputes can create.43 Collateral benefits reduce
financial and time burdens on the parties, preserve DILHR's
scarce resources since it does not have to preside over discov-
ery hearings,' and reduce reversible errors founded upon in-
correct discovery decisions. Thus, the Act's discovery
procedure has at least four integral objectives: (1) prevention
of discovery abuse; (2) expedition of the proceedings; (3) pres-
36. See supra note 29.
37. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 804.01(1) (1983-84); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a), (b)(1).
38. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 804.01(2), (3); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
39. Wis. STAT. § 102.17(1)(b), (e) (1983-84) are the best examples of this.
40. Id.
41. See supra notes 13-25 and accompanying text.
42. See Bituminous Casualty Co. v. DILHR, 97 Wis. 2d 730, 295 N.W.2d 183 (Ct.
App. 1980).
43. See Borgnis v. Falk Co. 147 Wis. 327, 337, 133 N.W. 209, 211 (1911).
44. DILHR employs 14 hearing examiners to conduct approximately 3,791 hear-
ings annually. Thus, each hearing examiner averages 271 hearings per year. U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, STATE
WORKER'S COMPENSATION: ADMINISTRATION PROFILES, 344 (Sept., 1983).
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ervation of DILHR's financial and personnel resources; and
(4) reduction of financial and time burdens on the parties.
Whether the Act's discovery rules advance these objectives
better than civil discovery procedures do is open to debate.
However, even if they do, it is necessary to ask whether the
cost is too high. Moreover, if there is a substantial price to be
paid for the advancement of these objectives, a further ques-
tion arises: Is there a more efficient, less problematic proce-
dure that will advance these objectives yet not demand such a
high price? This concern was expressed by Professor Larson:
[T]he theme pervading much of the adjectival law of work-
men's compensation is the necessity of striking a balance be-
tween relaxation of rules to prevent injustice and retention of
rules to ensure orderly decision making and protection of
fundamental rights.45
Wisconsin's ongoing, evolutionary effort to find the opti-
mal balance between procedural simplicity and substantive
fairness is evident in the changes the Act has incorporated
over the years. In 1911, when the Act was first created, there
was essentially no prehearing discovery.46 In 1931, the Act
was amended to permit DILHR47 to depose the parties, in-
spect the employer's premises, inspect the employer's books,
and direct the employee to submit to a medical examination.48
In 1943, the Act was amended to permit DILHR to appoint
an independent expert to investigate the cause of death.49 In
1949, the Act was amended to permit the employer to medi-
cally examine the employee50 and to permit either narty to
depose those witnesses who are beyond the reach of HR's
subpoena. 1 In 1961, the Act was amended to permit either
party to conduct depositions to preserve evidence for hearing
when the witness will likely be unavailable for the hearing.5 2
In 1971, the Act was amended to permit DILHR to investi-
45. LARSON, supra note 12 at § 77A.83.
46. See 1911 Wis. Laws 50.
47. Prior to 1931, DILHR was called the Industrial Commission. However, in the
interest of simplicity, DILHR is being uniformly used throughout this article.
48. See 1931 Wis. Laws 413 §§ l(b), (c).
49. See 1943 Wis. Laws 270 §§ 12, 14.
50. See 1949 Wis. Laws 107 § 4.
51. See 1949 Wis. Laws 107 § 5.
52. See 1961 Wis. Laws 621 § 24.
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gate alleged safety violations. 3 In 1977, the Act was amended
to create a prehearing conference where issues are to be clari-
fied and refined, possible admissions of fact are explored and
stipulations respecting documentary evidence may be pro-
cured. 4 In 1979, the Act was amended to permit either party
to subpoena documents for the hearing.5  In 1981, the Act
was amended to permit DILHR to order further disclosure of
information following the prehearing conference. 6 This
amendment also permitted the parties to utilize, at hearing,
reports respecting loss of earning capacity.57
These amendments of the Act illustrate an evolutionary
process whereby prehearing discovery rules are being ex-
panded while DILHR retains ultimate gatekeeping authority.
It is noteworthy that since the Act was created, the legislature
has never chosen to contract rather than expand such prehear-
ing discovery procedures.
D. Problems Attendant to Prehearing Discovery Rules.
Even as the scope of prehearing discovery has been ex-
panded over the years, the existing limitations on prehearing
discovery may still operate to interfere with the administra-
tion of justice and the promotion of just results. An examina-
tion of various worker's compensation cases58 reveals four
conceptual categories of deficiencies attributable to lack of ad-
equate methods of prehearing discovery. First, misinforma-
tion and misassumption of facts may account for failures of
proof at hearing. Second, substantial disparities between
pleadings and proof, never corrected during the course of pre-
hearing discovery, may cause preclusion at hearing of theories
of recovery and defenses to recovery. Third, lack of discovery
vehicles may interfere with a party's preparation of its case.
Fourth, lack of discovery vehicles prevents discovery of valua-
ble information which might otherwise affect the outcome of
the hearing.
53. See 1971 Wis. Laws 148 § 4.
54. See 1977 Wis. Laws 195 § 8.
55. See 1979 Wis. Laws 278 § 8.
56. See 1981 Wis. Laws 92 § 13.
57. Id.
58. To maximize the illustrative impact, cases from all jurisdictions have been
utilized.
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It is the thesis of this article that modification of the Act to
permit more party-initiated prehearing discovery will avoid
most of these problems and better serve the objectives of the
Act.
1. Misinformation and misassumption respecting critical
facts.
Misinformation and misassumptions respecting critical
facts can prove disastrous at hearing. Although information
respecting the applicant's wages, job history and job demands
is usually within the applicant's knowledge, often an appli-
cant's recollection or understanding of these facts is inaccu-
rate. Without prehearing discovery, an applicant has no way
of correcting such misinformation or misassumption respect-
ing critical facts.
Two illustrations of this problem come from this writer's
own trial experience. In a recent worker's compensation ac-
tion, Eckert v. Armour Food Company,59 Eckert alleged in his
compensation application that the maximum wage he earned
at Armour was $20,000 per year (which was not placed in
issue by Armour's answer). Eckert gave the same earnings
figure to Armour's vocational expert. However, apparently in
response to his own vocational expert's more specific question-
ing, Eckert revealed that he made an additional $6,000 per
year by pocketing the $125.00 per week provided him by Ar-
mour to hire someone to help load and unload his truck. At
the hearing, the examiner ruled that Eckert was bound by the
lower earnings figure because, to hold otherwise, would un-
fairly suprise Armour (and Armour's vocational expert).
Consequently, Eckert's vocational expert was required at
hearing to adjust his wage impairment opinion downward by
approximately twenty-five percent - an immediate loss to
Eckert of almost $6,000. If Armour would have had the op-
portunity to depose Eckert or his vocational expert prior to
the hearing, the "unfair surprise" argument would not have
prevailed.
An applicant's misinformation respecting the physical de-
mands of her job worked an even more disastrous result in
59. Hearing No. 39 394-32-0669 (May 7, 1984), aftd, September 21, 1984
(unreported).
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Olson v. Armour Food Company.60 In this case, Olson alleged
she was permanently and totally disabled due to debilitating
back and shoulder pain caused by repeated heavy lifting at
work. Olson told both her treating physician-medical expert
and Armour's medical expert that her meat packing jobs re-
quired her to lift 60 pounds at shoulder level. Apparently,
Olson was misinformed or confused as to the physical de-
mands of her several jobs since they actually required her to
lift no more than 25 pounds at shoulder level although she did
have to lift as much as 60 pounds at waist level. At the hear-
ing, evidence of this substantial factual inaccuracy underlying
the medical expert's opinion was offered. Consequently, the
hearing examiner determined that this expert's opinion was
fatally flawed. As a result, Olson's claim of permanent total
disability was denied in its entirety.
Disparities between an applicant's description to a medical
expert of work demands and actual work demands appear to
be common in worker's compensation actions.6' Moreover, if
an expert is not at the hearing to revise an opinion based on
misinformation, the hearing examiner is left with no alterna-
tive but to strike the opinion,62 thus working a possible
injustice.
In many cases, an employer's better access to the appli-
cant's work history creates an unfair advantage at hearing.63
The Olson v. Armour Food Company case64 serves as a good
illustration of this as well. The theory of Olson's case was
60. Hearing Nos. 81-47796, 81-45979, 81-24182 (March 22, 1984), af'd, August
24, 1984 (unreported).
61. See also, Erickson v. DILHR, 49 Wis. 2d 114, 126, 181 N.W.2d 495, 500-01
(1970); Davis v. Indus. Comm'n, 22 Wis. 2d 674, 679, 126 N.W.2d 611, 613-14 (1964);
Ostrowieoki v. Maynard Steel Corp., Hearing No. 80-52267 (May 12, 1982). Similarly,
employers' counsel attempt to undermine a medical opinion by establishing the inaccu-
racy of facts respecting the cause of the injury as assumed by the medical expert. See,
e.g., Soper v. Indus. Comm'n, 5 Wis. 2d 570, 574, 93 N.W.2d 329, 331 (1958); Pressed
Steel Tank Co. v. Indus. Comm'n 255 Wis. 333, 336, 38 N.W.2d 354, 355 (1949).
62. Pressed Steel Tank Co., 255 Wis. at 334, 38 N.W.2d at 355; Scott v. A.O. Smith
Corp., Hearing No. 81-05936 (Nov. 19, 1982).
63. In Lucas v. Phillip Lithographing Company, Hearing No. 391-34-6264 (Jan.
21, 1983) and Udelhofen v. Midwest Protein, Inc., Hearing No. 81-40109 (Dec. 13,
1982) both refusal to rehire actions, the employers' knowledge of the applicants' work
histories proved valuable in rebutting the applicants' charges that they were illegally
refused re-employment.
64. Hearing Nos. 81-47796, 81-45979, 81-24182 (March 22, 1984), aft'd, Aug. 24,
1984 (unreported).
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that repeated heavy lifting caused her disability. However,
Olson's sketchy recent work history, because of vacations, lay-
offs and illnesses, belied this fact. Since Olson, her attorney
and her experts were not privy to her attendance record, they
were not prepared to explain it in a manner consistent with
their theory. Instead, this fact undoubtedly encouraged the
hearing examiner to reject her claim in its entirety.
2. Disparity between pleading and proof.
There are countless examples where a party's pleading var-
ies so substantially from his proof at hearing that the proof is
precluded and an otherwise viable theory of recovery or de-
fense is lost. Of course, Wisconsin's Worker's Compensation
Act evinces a strong policy against dismissal of actions or the-
ories of recovery or defense where there are technical defects
in the pleadings or in the proceedings. 65 However, if the vari-
ance between pleading and proof is so great that the party is
prejudiced by the unfair surprise of having to deal at the hear-
ing with a theory entirely different than the one pleaded, the
variance may be deemed fatal.66 The struggle is between expe-
dience and due process:
The whole idea is to get away from the cumbersome pro-
cedures and technicalities of pleading, and to reach a right
decision by the shortest and quickest possible route. On the
other hand, as every lawyer knows, there is a point beyond
which the sweeping-aside of "technicalities" cannot go, since
evidentiary and procedural rules usually have an irreducible
hard core of necessary function that cannot be dispensed
within an orderly investigation of the merits of the case. The
question that constantly recurs in a survey of the procedural
side of workmen's compensation is whether, in any particu-
lar case involving a loss of benefits for procedural reasons
under an otherwise meritorious claim, the indispensibility of
the procedural purpose so served outweighs the thwarting of
the protective functions of the act.67
65. Cruz v. DILHR, 81 Wis. 2d 442, 450, 260 N.W.2d 692, 695 (1978). See also
Int'l Harvester v. Indus. Comm'n, 157 Wis. 167, 147 N.W. 53 (1914); LARSON, supra
note 12, at § 77A.45.
66. Id.
67. LARSON, supra note 12, at § 77A.10.
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A few cases illustrate the risks attendant to this problem.
In Sun Control Tile Company v. Industrial Commission,68 the
applicant's pleading alleged an industrially-related knee in-
jury. However, as the preparation of the case progressed, and
as a direct consequence of his knee injury, the applicant devel-
oped a back injury as well. Since respondent-employer was
not apprised of this fact prior to the hearing, the Commission
disallowed evidence on this "new" claim:
We think it would be violative of the most fundamental
concepts of due process to allow a claimant to litigate an
entirely new injury, even one which is a consequence of a
previous injury, without giving the carrier meaningful
notice.69
Employers, too, are subject to this problem. In Hannigan
v. Goldfarb, t/a 20th Century Cab,7 ° the applicant was killed
while driving a cab for his employer, 20th Century Cab.
Without having pleaded intoxication as an affirmative de-
fense,71 the employer attempted to offer such proof at the
hearing. The New Jersey court affirmed the Commission's
preclusion of such proof, stating in pertinent part:
Here, however, the petitioner had no warning of the de-
fense of intoxication until the proceedings were one short
step to completion, 17 months after the accident and seven
months after the petition was filed. . . . Upon near comple-
tion of its defense, a party, albeit a party in a workmen's
compensation court where niceties of pleadings have never
been required, who has proceeded throughout on one issue,
will not be permitted to then suddenly present a totally new
attack.72
In Gallagher v. Industrial Commission,73 the Commission
appointed Dr. Eichman, a neurologist, to examine the appli-
cant. It was Dr. Eichman's opinion that the applicant suf-
68. 117 Ariz. 268, 571 P.2d 1064 (Ct. App. 1977).
69. Id. at 271, 571 P.2d at 1066 (1977). See also Munroe Memorial Hospital v.
Thompson, 388 So. 2d 1338, 1339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), where the applicant
pleaded a back injury and attempted to prove a knee injury as well. As in Sun Control
Tile, this "new" claim was disallowed based on due process.
70. 55 N.J. Super. 260, 150 A.2d 515 (1959).
71. In its answer, 20th Century Cab only generally denied that the accident was
employment related. Id. at 262, 150 A.2d at 517.
72. Id. at 263, 150 A.2d at 518.
73. 9 Wis. 2d 361, 101 N.W.2d 72 (1960).
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fered from an industrially-related conversion hysteria injury.
However, the applicant's pleading and proof only included
physical injury to her right hip and ankle. Thus, the Commis-
sion, and the reviewing court, rejected any theory of injury
based on Dr. Eichman's testimony: "There was no issue of
fact created by the pleadings on conversion hysteria, nor was
the case tried on that theory. ' 74 The significance of this out-
come seems to be that unless the parties are privy to all dis-
covery that DILHR conducts, and the pleadings are amended
to incorporate such discovery, a critical theory of recovery or
defense could be lost. Merely providing that DILHR must
give each party a summary report of such discovery75 may
well prove insufficient.
Thus, as the cases discussed above indicate, although
DILHR reserves the right to conduct discovery and uncover
the truth of the case, it is arguable that unless a party pleads
the theory that DILHR discovers, such theory is subject to
preclusion at hearing. This problem is further complicated by
the fact that DILHR can conduct such discovery ex parte.6
3. Lack of discovery interfering with a party's ability to
prosecute or defend.
Lack of opportunity to conduct discovery can even deprive
a party of his constitutional right to a fair hearing. Bitumi-
nous Casualty Company v. DILHR77 provides a graphic illus-
tration of the due process ramifications of such prohibitions
on prehearing discovery. In Bituminous Casualty Company,
the applicant, John Gibson, had previously been compensated
for a two percent permanent disability. Gibson then applied
for additional compensation and his employer, N.M. Isabella,
74. In Int'l Harvester v. Indus. Comm'n, 157 Wis. 167, 173, 147 N.W. 53, 56
(1914), the Industrial Commission, having conducted ex parte discovery, commented:
The statute carefully provided for one full and fair hearing on the merits. This
necessarily included the right on the part of both parties to know what the
[Commission's ex parte] testimony taken without notice tended to prove. Other-
wise it could not be met, no matter how successfully the party against whom it
operated might meet it, if he knew what it was. . . . [It] would be a much more
serious and prejudicial error to decide an important controversy on evidence
which the defeated party did not and could not know of.
75. Id. at 368, 101 N.W.2d at 76.
76. Wis. STAT. § 102.17(1)(e) (1983-84).
77. 97 Wis. 2d 730, 295 N.W.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1980).
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Inc., denied the additional liability stating that it had no infor-
mation to justify further compensation. Pursuant to a con-
trolling provision of the Wisconsin Administrative Code,78
Isabella then requested that DILHR order the exchange of
medical information. DILHR denied Isabella's request for
Gibson's medical information presumably because evaluation
of the need for such medical information could be accom-
plished at the prehearing conference. However, the prehearing
conference was never held. A DILHR hearing examiner then
told Isabella that if evidence was presented at the hearing that
constituted a claim substantially beyond what Isabella could
have reasonably anticipated, a further hearing "presumably"
would be permitted.79
At the hearing, Gibson placed in evidence medical testi-
mony of a two or three precent disability and vocational testi-
mony of a fifty percent wage impairment. Based on this new
vocational testimony, Isabella requested a further hearing in
which to offer rebuttal vocational evidence. DILHR denied
this request and entered an award of fifty percent permanent
disability.8 0
The appellate court found that DILHR's refusal to permit
Isabella to procure current information regarding Gibson's
claim, to know the identity of Gibson's witnesses, and to know
the true nature of Gibson's claim prior to the hearing, consti-
tuted a denial of Isabella's due process rights to seasonably
know the claim against it and to meet the claim with compe-
tent evidence."' The holding necessitated another hearing.82
78. See supra note 32.
79. 97 Wis. 2d at 732-33, 295 N.W.2d at 185.
80. Id.
81. 97 Wis. 2d at 734-35, 295 N.W.2d at 186. The appellate court held that an
employer has a due process right to know the identity of the applicant's witnesses and
vocational evidence prior to the time it presents its rebuttal evidence either through
prehearing disclosure or a further hearing. Yet, there are no procedural guarantees that
such information will be granted to an employer. Currently, there are no procedural
rules requiring exchange of non-medical information. Bituminous Casualty Co., 97 Wis.
2d at 741 n. 1, 285 N.W.2d at 189 n. 1, (Gartzke, J., dissenting) makes it clear that Wis.
ADMIN. CODE § IND 80.21 does not require such disclosure. Moreover, whether to
hold a prehearing conference, at which the exchange of witnesses and non-medical in-
formation might be ordered, is discretionary with DILHR. (Wis. STAT. § 102.17(l)(b)
(1983-84) provides that DILHR "may" direct the parties to appear at a preheating
conference). Accordingly, the present state of the rules of procedure may well lead to
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4. Facts never known because of lack of discovery.
Without methods of prehearing discovery available to a
party, it can never be known for certain what information was
available to bolster the case. It is certainly conceivable that
many cases end in a result contrary to the just result because
of a lack of information available to the losing party. For in-
stance, in Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company v. Indus-
trial Commission, the applicant applied for and received
unemployment compensation benefits based on an injury that
later became the subject of a worker's compensation action.
In the unemployment compensation application, the applicant
attested that he was ready and able to work; while, in the
workmen's compensation action, he alleged that he was dis-
abled and unable to work.84  The Commission permitted this
admission against interest, denied compensation, and the re-
viewing court affirmed.8 5  Had this information not been dis-
coverable by the employer, the result in this case may well
have been different. 86
These examples are not intended to be an all-encompass-
ing list of problems due to the lack of party-initiated discovery
under the Act. However, they do serve as illustrations of
problems that lead to unfocused and unfair hearings, the need
further hearings, with concomitant further delays and expense, in order to comply with
due process.
82. 97 Wis. 2d at 734-35, 295 N.W.2d at 186.
83. 23 Ill. 2d 497, 179 N.E.2d 1 (1962).
84. Id. at 499-500, 179 N.E.2d at 2-3. The applicant also applied for and received
disability pay from a company fund designed to compensate for non-industrial injuries.
The applicant, on his application for these benefits, told an investigator he had incurred
no recent industrial injury. This evidence, too, was admitted. Of course, such a com-
pany funded disability policy would be within the employer's knowledge. However,
with the recent growth in private insurance companies providing such disability poli-
cies, such information would not be available to an employer without a change in the
Act's discovery rules.
85. In a similar case, United States Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 8 Ill. 2d
407, 413-14, 134 N.E.2d 307, 310 (1956), the Illinois Supreme Court implied the impor-
tance of such admissions against interests. "Obviously statements in formal written
documents [claims for benefits for non industrial injuries] cannot be tendered at face
value for the purpose of obtaining benefits and then lightly explained away when they
stand in the way of claims for [worker's compensation] benefits of an inconsistent
nature."
86. See also Johnson v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., Hearings Nos. 81-30777,
81-30778 (Feb. 18, 1983) (hearing examiners noted the applicant's application for un-
employment benefits in denying worker's compensation).
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for time consuming and expensive post hearing procedures,
and, at times, reversals and new hearings.
II. PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS TO THE EXISTING
DISCOVERY RULES UNDER WISCONSIN'S
WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT
Historically, civil litigation was said to culminate in "trial
by ambush. ' 87 This condition existed primarily because of the
lack of sufficient methods of discovering the opponent's case
prior to trial.88 Lack of information and misinformation often
worked unjust results. With adoption of liberal discovery
rules for civil litigation, parties now have ample methods and
opportunity to educate themselves prior to trial. Indeed, trial
often enlightens only the fact finder. In this manner, liberal
discovery rules promote just results.
Discovery rules serve another important purpose as well.
In addition to permitting a party to discover the factual and
legal position of the opposing party, discovery assists parties
and the court to define and narrow the disputed factual89 and
legal90 issues in advance of trial. Thus, if discovery rules are
properly employed, discovery can expedite rather than pro-
tract proceedings. 91 Similarly, party-initiated prehearing dis-
covery can serve to increase fairness and expediency in
worker's compensation actions as well. Of course, while
DILHR has the authority to conduct all modes of discovery
on behalf of the parties, it is safe to assume, at least in many
cases, that its discovery is not as thorough as would be made
by a private litigant.92
87. See generally Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
88. See id.
89. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958); Hickman v. Tay-
lor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
90. Id.
91. See Teller v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 27 F. Supp. 938, 941 (E.D. Pa.
1939). Employment of discovery tools can actually serve to conserve judicial energies.
Burns v. Thiokol Chemical Corp., 483 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973).
92. In Knob v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp., 118 Ohio App. 324, 194 N.E.2d 599
(1963), the Ohio Court of Appeals came to this same conclusion:
Defendant's basic contention is that plaintiff should simply file her claim and
thus set in motion the investigative machinery of the administrator who will then
fully inquire into the facts for her and determine the merits of her claim; ....
Whether the Industrial Commission would in fact investigate the broad, gen-
eral complaint contained in this petition, such an investigation by an impartial
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A. Discovery Rules Under Other States' Worker's
Compensation Laws.
The scope of discovery in worker's compensation actions
is not uniform among the states. Moreover, about eighty per-
cent of the states permit more party-initiated discovery than
Wisconsin. A fundamental rationale for tolerating and even
promoting disparity in the law among the various states is that
stated by Supreme Court Justice Brandeis: "It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel and social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country." 93
Fairness and expediency are objectives shared by all
worker's compensation laws.94 Yet, the manner in which
states employ discovery rules to advance these objectives
nearly run the gamut of conceivable alternatives.
Wisconsin, as discussed above, permits almost no party-
initiated discovery.95 Generally, such discovery is limited to
exchange of medical information.96 Additional discovery, if
any, is conducted by DILHR. Only eight other states share
this restrictive discovery scheme. 97
A substantial majority of states represent the opposite ex-
treme and provide that the scope of discovery in worker's
compensation actions is coterminous with the scope of discov-
agency or tribunal is not the equivalent of a personal inquiry pursued with the
diligent zeal of an interested party; it would be at most a vicarious inquiry, be-
yond plaintiff's power to direct. This is no reflection up on its quality, but an
analysis of its nature. Plaintiff should be permitted to prepare her own case and
not required to entrust it exclusively to others.
Id. at 326-27, 194 N.E.2d at 600. Couple this fact with the fact of DILHR's scarce
resources (DILHR's hearing examiners conduct an average of one hearing on each
working day), see supra note 44, and it is a safe assumption that a private litigant, in
certain circumstances, will more thoroughly discover its case.
93. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
94. LARSON, supra note 12, at § 77A.10.
95. See supra notes 10-38 and accompanying text.
96. See Wis. STAT. § 102.13(2) (1983-84); Wis. ADMIN. CODE § IND 80.21 (1984).
97. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1328 (1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 386-71, 79,
80, 86, 97 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. § 342.260(2) (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-03
(1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 835 (Purdon 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 62-
7-13 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-225 (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 603.605
(1984).
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ery in civil actions. Most states have provided for this discov-
ery scheme by statute.98 However, some states have relied on
judicial interpretation of their worker's compensation acts99 to
reach the same result.
States representing the middle ground have approached
discovery in a variety of ways, however, all states conditions
party-initiated prehearing discovery upon approval of the
state's worker's compensation agency. North Carolina's dis-
covery rules, for example, require the interested party to first
show that such discovery is warranted: "Any party to a pro-
ceeding under this Article may, upon application to the Com-
mission, which application shall set forth the materiality of the
evidence to be given, cause the depositions of witnesses resid-
ing within or without the state to be taken, . ..° New Mex-
ico actively involves the Commission:
It is provided, however, that any interrogatories, discovery
procedures and depositions authorized by the Rules of Civil
Procedure shall be had only after motion of one of the parties
therefore and the court having jurisdiction finds, after due
hearing, that good cause exists, that the evidence to be ob-
98. See ALA. CODE § 25-8-81(a)(1) (1975); ALASKA SirAT. § 23.30.115(a) (1984);
CAL. LAB. CODE § 5710(a)(West 1971); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-1-120 (1973); FLA.
STAT. § 440.30 (19-); IDAHO CODE § 72-709(3) (1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
§ 138.16 (1959); IOWA CODE § 86.21 (1962); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-544 (1981); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 93(3) (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 8(a) (1979);
MINN. STAT. § 176.411(2) (1953); Miss. RULE 9 OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION RULES
OF PROCEDURE; Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.560 (1959); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 616.240(2)(a),
(b) (1943); NEW YORK WORKER'S COMPENSATION RULE 121; OKLA. WORKER'S
CoMp. RULE 2 (as interpreted in Ok. Iron & Metal Co. v. Sandoval, 434 P.2d 247, 249
(Okla. 1967)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3-160 (Law. Co-op. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 35-1-85.1 (1953); VA. CODE § 65.1-95 (1980); W. VA. CODE § 23-1-11 (1985); Wyo.
STAT. § 27-12-607 (1957).
99. See, e.g. Camelback Contractors, Inc. v. Industrial Comm., 125 Ariz. 205, 608
P.2d 782 (Ct. App. 1980); Georgia Power v. Brown, 169 Ga. App. 45, 316 S.E.2d 536
(Ct. App. 1983); Josam Mfg. Co. v. Ross, 428 N.E.2d 74, (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Bog-
getta v. Burroughs Corp., 368 Mich. 600, 118 N.W.2d 980 (1962); Best v. London
Guarantee & Accident Co., 100 Mont. 332, 47 P.2d 656 (1935); U.S. Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Gagne, 102 N.H. 290, 155 A.2d 804 (1959); Welch v. Essex County, 6 N.J.
Super. 422, 68 A.2d 787 (Essex County Ct. 1949), affid, 6 N.J. Super. 184, 70 A.2d 779
(Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1950); Eberhardt v. Sonsade Realty Corp., 251 N.Y.S.2d 264, 21
A.D.2d 951 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964) (interpreting N.Y. WORK COMP. LAW § 121 (con-
sol. 19-)); Warner v. Bay View Hotel, 74 R.I. 264, 60 A.2d 488 (1948).
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-80(a) (1983) (emphasis added).
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tained will probably be material to the issues of the cause and
the court enters an order authorizing the same.1"'
A number of other states have similar statutory schemes.10 2
Thus, in these states, all avenues of discovery permitted
in civil actions are available to parties in a worker's compen-
sation action. However, the worker's compensation agency
reserves a "gate-keeping" function and thereby protects
against burdensome and abusive discovery tactics.
One other noteworthy variation on discovery schemes is
provided not by a state's worker's compensation law but, in-
stead, by the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina. In the District Court for the District of
South Carolina, by local rule of court,103 parties are required
to file and serve answers to standard interrogatories created
and adopted by the court. The standard interrogatories di-
rected toward the plaintiff are filed by the plaintiff at the
time he files his complaint and a copy of these answers is
served on the defendant with the complaint. °4 The stan-
dard interrogatories directed toward the defendant are filed
and served on the plaintiff within thirty days after the time
for answering expires."10 Thus, under this new practice, the
South Carolina District Court conducts some preliminary
discovery aimed at defining and narrowing the issues. Since
these interrogatories are standardized, this court-initiated
discovery is accomplished with a minimum of judicial
burden.
These standard interrogatories, which are designed for
use in all types of actions except those expressly excluded by
the local rule,10 6 are designed to accomplish the following
functions: provide the court and the opposing party with the
factual background of the claim(s) or defense(s); identify all
applicable law; identify all anticipated lay and expert wit-
nesses; provide defendant with an itemization of damages;
identify any subrogation interest(s); and identify all antici-
101. N.M. STAT. ANN. 52-1-34 (1983) (emphasis added).
102. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2348(a) (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 152, § 5 (West 1983); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.09 (1983).
103. See D.C.S.C. M83-3.
104. Id. at 7.
105. Id. at 7.
106. It appears many pro se actions are included as well. The Rule provides that
only where "all plaintiffs are unrepresented by an attorney," the parties are relieved
from filing answers to such interrogatories. Id. at 2.
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pated discovery.107 While a party's interrogatories are some-
times abused in civil litigation, it might be anticipated that
because the court poses these questions, more complete an-
swers will be forthcoming.
B. The Proposal.
The Wisconsin Worker's Compensation Act is structured
so DILHR maintains control of discovery and thereby con-
trols discovery abuse. However, the existing structure often
results in unfocused and unfair hearings. Throughout the life
of Wisconsin's Worker's Compensation Act, the Wisconsin
legislature has continually expanded discovery while main-
taining the general structure that permits DILHR to act as
gatekeeper. Further expansion, through application of some
of the experiments from other states' laboratories, can allevi-
ate the problems of unfocused and unfair hearings while main-
taining DILHR's role as gatekeeper against discovery abuse.
Presiding Judge Gartzke, in his dissenting opinion in Bitumi-
nous Casualty Company v. DILHR, 10 8 presaged this sugges-
tion concerning discovery:
If neither party must disclose the nature of the nonmedical
evidence it will present, then each party may feel forced to
retain an economic expert for fear that the other side will do
so. If the parties must produce not only medical but eco-
nomic experts, the cost of worker's compensation hearings
will be considerably increased. That may become a compel-
ling reason, if the legislature or department deems it such, to
force complete prehearing disclosures in the future.109
First, to avoid such recurring problems as misidentifica-
tion of parties and reliance on misinformation about such
things as work, medical and vocational' 10 history, standard in-
terrogatories, understandable by lay people, could be pro-
pounded by DILHR and distributed to the parties in a
manner similar to that now in effect in the United States Dis-
107. Id. at 3-6.
108. 97 Wis. 2d 730, 295 N.W.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1980).
109. Id. at 741, 295 N.W.2d at 189 (footnotes omitted).
110. In Bituminous Casualty Co., both the majority and dissenting opinions took
cognizance of the increasingly important role of vocational economic experts while la-
menting the lack of any rules requiring prehearing disclosure of their opinions. Id. at
738, 741, 295 N.W.2d at 188-89.
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trict Court for the District of South Carolina."'l These inter-
rogatories could provide DILHR and the opposing party with
factual background of the claim or defense, identity of all an-
ticipated lay or expert witnesses, an itemization of damages,
and a description of any anticipated further discovery.
Second, further party-initiated discovery, depositions of
lay or expert witnesses, inspection of employer's records or
premises, or further interrogatories, for example, could be per-
mitted only upon approval by DILHR. DILHR could re-
quire a specific showing of need and a specific outline of the
type of discovery requested as well as the subjects of such dis-
covery. In deciding whether to permit such discovery,
DILHR could consider such things as the nature and severity
of the subject injury; the extent and completeness of discovery
to that date; the opposing party's ability to participate in or
accomodate such further discovery; and the good faith shown
by the requesting party in the discovery process to that date.
In this manner, the attendant burden on the parties of further
discovery could be conditioned upon a showing of reasonable
necessity. 112
Under the scheme suggested, DILHR would maintain its
role as gatekeeper, and discovery abuse could be kept to a
minimum.1 13 If such further discovery requests are required
before the prehearing conference, and considered at the pre-
hearing conference, dates for such further discovery could be
established with little additional burden on DILHR.
In order to avoid burdensome discovery in smaller actions,
such expansion of the Act's discovery rules might best be lim-
ited to those worker's compensation actions that involves seri-
ous injuries. According to DILHR's data, only about 13% of
all cases closed in 1983 involved death or permanent injury;
yet, those 13% permanent injury or death cases accounted for
111. See supra text accompanying notes 104-09.
112. One such valid purpose is to encourage narrative testimony by medical experts
while limiting the burden on their practices. In Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. McLaurin, 370
So. 2d 1359, 1362 (Miss. 1979), the court recognized "the necessary cost of producing
live medical testimony at hearings" as well as physicians' reluctance to attend them.
113. Of course, sanctions similar to those available to a court in civil actions should
be made available to DILHR as well. See Wis. STAT. § 804.12 (1983-84).
1985]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
58% of total benefits paid in 1983.114 Accordingly, such ex-
pansion of the Act's discovery rules might best be limited to
these costly actions that allege either permanency or death.115
Certainly from the applicant's perspective, a total disabil-
ity case warrants the most thorough preparation and presenta-
tion at hearing. From the employer's perspective, where
multiple hundreds of thousands of dollars are at stake,1 16 the
need for thorough preparation for hearing is no less than in
any other litigation involving such substantial exposure. In
U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty v. Gagne,117 the reviewing court, af-
ter taking cognizance that worker's compensation actions
must be summary and simple, commented:
However, there may be instances in workmen's compensa-
tion appeals where it is not only desirable but necessary that
a party use depositions or discovery process in properly pre-
paring his case for trial. In this case it is the employer who
seeks the information but the process of acquiring informa-
tion by deposition or discovery cuts both ways and tommor-
row it may be the employee who needs it. It should be
available to both parties when circumstances require it.'18
III. CONCLUSION
Discovery rules, as they exist today under the Worker's
Compensation Act, may or may not advance the Act's objec-
tive to resolve work-related personal injuries with a minimum
expenditure of time, money, and other scarce resources.
114. According to DILHR's "Preliminary Data: Summary of Cases Initially
Closed in 1983," 6807 of a total of 53,803 worker's compensation cases closed in 1983
involved death or permanency. According to that same report, $41,469,600 of a total of
$71,264,900 total benefits paid on cases closed in 1983 involved payments for death or
permanent injury.
115. This discovery scheme may have the added benefit of discouraging applicants'
attorneys from exaggerating their clients' conditions since to do so will invite discovery
beyond the scope actually warranted by the condition.
116. A permanently, totally disabled worker is entitled to $300.00+ per week for
1,000 weeks ($300,000+ total) as per the formula contained in the statutes. See Wis.
STAT. § 102.44 (1983-84). Such a worker is also entitled to wage payments for the
healing period, which might last several years. See Wis. STAT. § 102.43 (1983-84). To
this must be added such "incidental compensation" as the cost of medical treatment,
prosthetic devices and rehabilitation (physical and vocational). See Wis. STAT.
§ 102.42 (1983-84). Add to this the maximum $50,000 death benefit (§ 102.46), and
such a claim can be worth several hundreds of thousands of dollars.
117. 102 N.H. 290, 155 A.2d 804 (1959).
118. Id. at 292, 155 A.2d at 805.
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However, the price paid for such expediency is that hearings
are often unfocused and ill-defined. Perhaps more distressing,
parties are too frequently "ambushed", and the truth is not
always fully represented at the hearing. At times this results
in an injustice. At other times, this necessitates a second hear-
ing.119 Both of these consequences are antithetical to the pur-
poses of the Act. Expansion and modification of the Act's
discovery rules, consistent with the objectives and policy un-
derpinnings of the Act, will preserve the laudable objectives of
the Act while minimizing the concommitant problems.
The Council on Worker's Compensation 20 should con-
sider proposing such a modification of the Act to the
legislature.
119. See, e.g., Bituminous Casualty Co. v. DILHR, 97 Wis. 2d 730, 734-35, 295
N.W.2d 183, 186 (Ct. App. 1980); Balczewski v. DILHR, 76 Wis. 2d 487, 490, 251
N.W.2d 794, 796 (1977).
120. Wis. STAT. § 102.14 (1983-84) creates an advisory committee, called the
Council on Worker's Compensation, whose purpose is to "submit its recommendations
with respect to amendments to [the Worker's Compensation Act] to each regular ses-
sion of the legislature .. " Id.
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